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Daniel 0. Conkfez 
According to Professor Stephen M. Griffin, contemporary 
constitutional theory has focused too narrowly on the Supreme 
Court's elaboration of constitutional law and, in so doing, it has 
neglected the political dimension of American constitutionalism. 
Griffin suggests that the most important task of constitutional 
theory is to explain the process by which the meaning of the Con-
stitution has evolved over time, but he argues that the Supreme 
Court's role in this process has been greatly exaggerated. Grif-
fin's response is to seek "a theory of constitutional change that 
will situate the Constitution in the continuous flow of American 
political development."3 (p. 7) 
Griffin begins by recounting the emergence of judicial re-
view, through which "the Constitution was legalized" (p. 17) by 
treating it much like other forms of law. This "legalization of the 
Constitution" (p. 18) made it enforceable by the courts, but only 
to a limited extent, since the judiciary's institutional limitations 
prevented the courts from giving full effect to the Constitution's 
many values. As a result, legalization left "large areas of the con-
stitutional order subject to ordinary political change," (p. 18) a 
situation that continues to prevail today. Although outside the 
domain of "the legalized Constitution," (p. 18) however, these 
areas remain a part of the Constitution itself, understood more 
broadly as "a text-based institutional practice." (p. 56) 
1. Associate Professor of Law, Thlane University. 
2. Professor of Law and Nelson Poynter Senior Scholar, Indiana University-
Bloomington. 
3. Griffin calls his book an "introduction" to American constitutional theory, but 
he emphasizes that it is "a critical introduction." (p. ix; emphasis in original) 
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Because the Constitution, on this understanding, includes 
non-legal as well as legal dimensions, constitutional change can 
occur not only through formal amendments and judicial interpre-
tations, but also through political developments. Over the past 
two centuries, formal amendments have been few in number, 
leading many to suppose that judicial interpretation has been the 
primary source of constitutional change. But Griffin finds this 
view "profoundly mistaken." (p. 42) He points to a variety of 
political changes that, in his view, should be regarded as "consti-
tutional" but not "legal" changes. (p. 27) Early changes in-
cluded the development of the President's cabinet and the 
emergence of political parties. In this century, the most impor-
tant constitutional changes, dating to the New Deal, have been 
the growth of federal governmental power and, within the fed-
eral government, the growth of the President's power in relation 
to that of Congress. 
In support of his claim that the judiciary plays a secondary 
role in the process of constitutional change, Griffin notes that 
courts must await litigation and are rarely in a position to insti-
tute major constitutional changes on their own. The massive 
growth of federal power during the New Deal and thereafter, for 
example, was (eventually) permitted by the Supreme Court, but 
the Court certainly did not initiate this development. More gen-
erally, the pattern of its constitutional rulings suggests that the 
Supreme Court is, indeed, the weakest branch of government,4 
and that its power is substantially dependent on that of the popu-
lar federal branches. Thus, the Court rarely has invalidated fed-
eral, as opposed to state, governmental practices. And when it 
has invalidated federal practices, its decisions often have had 
political support within one or even both of the political 
branches, permitting the Court to profit institutionally from the 
separation and dispersion of federal political power. 
Griffin devotes the initial portion of his book-almost the 
first half of his book-to developing his political theory of the 
Constitution and constitutional change. Proceeding from the 
theoretical vantage point that he has thus constructed, he then 
turns his attention to what he describes as the more conventional 
questions of constitutional theory. These questions focus on the 
Supreme Court and its role in the American constitutional sys-
tem. Griffin believes that the contemporary debate on these 
4. See Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 521, 522-24 
(Wesleyan U. Press, 1961}. 
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questions is seriously flawed because, in essence, it is politically 
naive. He offers a number of interesting insights. 
In addressing the fundamental question of whether judicial 
review is undemocratic, writes Griffin, we must test the practice 
against the standards of contemporary American democracy, not 
against the democratic standards of previous historical periods. 
And he argues that our contemporary democracy differs from 
that "of the Framers and Progressive reformers" in five impor-
tant respects. In particular, contemporary American democracy 
(1) "recognizes the importance of a national guarantee of civil 
rights and civil liberties, ... including the right to vote, to run for 
office, and to participate in politics generally"; (2) accepts polit-
ical parties and interest groups as legitimate participants in the 
political system; (3) is "populist" in the sense that it depends es-
sentially on direct election and includes "a more direct role for 
public opinion in the policy process in the form of polls, initia-
tives, and referenda"; (4) rejects white supremacy; and (5) rejects 
any meaningful constitutional limit on the national political 
agenda, assuming sufficient popular demand. (pp. 103-04) Grif-
fin notes that this new democratic reality-the emergence of 
modern democracy, especially in the wake of the civil rights 
movement-has led in recent decades to significant congressional 
protection of individual rights. With Congress taking the lead to 
an increasing extent, the role of the Supreme Court in protecting 
individual rights has not only become less important, but also 
more difficult to defend. 
To the extent that the Supreme Court does engage in consti-
tutional decisionmaking, according to Griffin, its efforts continue 
to be shaped by the legalization of the Constitution in early 
American history. When the Constitution was legalized, the 
courts treated it essentially like other forms of law, and, not sur-
prisingly, they turned to various legal sources as they approached 
the task of constitutional interpretation. This resulted in a "plu-
ralistic theory of constitutional interpretation" (p. 145) that-
with modifications reflecting more general changes in American 
legal practices-continues to be "the best descriptive-explana-
tory account of constitutional interpretation." (p. 148) Accord-
ing to this theory, the Supreme Court and other courts look to 
various sources when they interpret the Constitution, including 
"the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, prece-
dent, inferences from the structure of the Constitution, and the 
national ethos or tradition." (p. 148) At this descriptive-explan-
212 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:209 
atory level, then, Griffin endorses the theories of scholars such as 
Philip Bobbitt, Richard Fallon, and Robert Post.s 
At a normative level, by contrast, Griffin notes that the plu-
ralistic theory is defensible only on the assumption that the legal-
ization of the Constitution was and remains desirable. In fact, 
claims Griffin, this legalization has created a false distinction be-
tween law and politics. Especially when the Supreme Court in-
terprets general constitutional language, such as that of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cannot readily defend its de-
cisions without "reach[ing] beyond the law to principles of mo-
rality and politics." (p. 188) Even so, the Court-supported by 
lawyers and constitutional scholars-strives to defend its role as 
a "legal" function, one that reflects and maintains the distinction 
between constitutional law and ordinary politics. The legal com-
munity thus "maneuver[s] to protect the autonomy of the law by 
maintaining the legalized Constitution," (p. 188) but its effort is 
ultimately in vain. If so, then the legitimacy of the Court's inter-
pretive function may properly be questioned, for it depends in 
part on the perpetuation of a fiction. 
Griffin's basic project, however, is not so much to critique 
the Supreme Court's role in constitutional interpretation, and 
therefore the Court's role in the process of constitutional change, 
as it is to suggest that the importance of this role has been sub-
stantially overstated. Looking to the future, moreover, he sug-
gests that "the most important and pressing constitutional issues 
have very little to do with the constitutional doctrines developed 
by the Supreme Court." (p. 193) Instead, they relate to continu-
ing power disputes between the President and Congress and to 
"the long-term trend toward increased distrust of politicians and 
government," (p. 200) a trend that Griffin regards as "the most 
disturbing aspect of the contemporary constitutional system." (p. 
200) 
Throughout his book, Griffin relies on a broad and diverse 
array of sources, not only from the law and legal scholarship, but 
also from the fields of history and political science.6 He discusses 
the work of political scientists of the behavioral tradition, for ex-
ample, and he uses the concept of the state to help illuminate the 
5. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford U. 
Press, 1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 30 Representations 13 (1990). 
6. Griffin's references are easy to find, in footnotes that appear-as they should-
at the bottom of each page. 
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role and importance of political institutions in implementing con-
stitutional power. This is interdisciplinary scholarship at its best. 
Griffin provides an important corrective to the prevailing 
approach to constitutional theory-what he calls the "legalistic 
or Supreme Court-centered approach." (p. 5) At the same time, 
however, he may go too far in the other direction, underesti-
mating the importance of the Court's role in our constitutional 
system. For example, Griffin decries the joint opinion of Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey.7 According to Griffin, the joint opinion "trumpets the 
primacy of the legalized Constitution . . . [and] asserts that the 
Court is at the center of the American constitutional universe; 
that its actions best embody the essence of American constitu-
tionalism." (p. 207-08) As Griffin must concede, however, the 
view expressed in the joint opinion is broadly accepted in the 
legal and political cultures of contemporary America. And this 
widespread perception of the Supreme Court-fully accurate or 
not-itself emboldens the Court, ensuring that it will continue to 
play a powerful role in the process of constitutional change. 
Although it may be exaggerated, Griffin's essential claim is 
nonetheless insightful and important. In the law schools, at least, 
teaching and scholarship about the Constitution have focused 
primarily on the legalized Constitution, including the Supreme 
Court's protection of individual rights. As Griffin maintains, 
however, this focus neglects the more political aspects of Ameri-
can constitutionalism and American constitutional development. 
Does this mean that law professors should move away from 
their "legalistic," "Supreme Court-centered" approach (p. 5) to 
the Constitution and constitutional theory? I think not, at least 
not in the sense of changing the basic focus of their teaching and 
scholarship. Law schools, after all, are in the business of teaching 
students to be lawyers, and potentially judges. As a result, it 
seems entirely appropriate for their courses on the Constitu-
tion-and for the scholarship of their faculty-to concentrate on 
the legalized Constitution, which, as Griffin himself points out, 
"provides the framework in which lawyers and judges work." (p. 
206) 
This is hardly to suggest that Griffin's book is irrelevant to 
the work of law professors and their students. The book includes 
insightful commentary on the descriptive and normative constitu-
tional questions that law schools customarily confront. Perhaps 
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Griffin's commentary is directed to general language in the 
joint opinion, not to the specific constitutional issues that the Court was deciding. 
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more important, Griffin identifies the constitutional issues that 
law schools tend to ignore. At the very least, then, this book 
should teach constitutional law professors and their students that 
their field of study is limited; that the Constitution is more than 
the legalized Constitution; and that the Supreme Court's claims 
to the contrary are profoundly mistaken. 
RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DE-
MOCRACY. Ronald F. Thiemann.! Washington, D.C.: 
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Scott C. Idlemanz 
It is ironic, but not entirely surprising, that our constitutional 
jurisprudence of religion has substantially evolved to date with-
out the serious influence of those, such as theologians and clergy, 
who are most learned in the nature and practice of religion. 
Although religious experts are occasionally summoned for testi-
monial purposes and courts occasionally advert to authoritative 
works on religion-and while there are, to be sure, a handful of 
legal professionals who actually have formal training in reli-
gion-by and large these are exceptions to the self-styled auto-
nomy of the law. Indeed, despite suggestions to the contrary, law 
remains the lawyer's dominion, and the law of religion is no 
exception.3 
It is precisely this context that makes Ronald Thiemann's 
Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy all the more 
interesting and valuable a contribution to the field.4 An or-
dained Lutheran minister and a theologian of genuine caliber, 
Thiemann poses in his book the familiar question: "What role 
should religion and religiously based moral convictions play 
1. Dean, Harvard Divinity School, and John Lord O'Brian Professor of Divinity, 
Harvard University. 
2. Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank 
Elizabeth Staton Idleman and Daniel P. Meyer for their insightful comments. 
3. For a recent exhortation to the legal community to engage in a deeper under-
standing of religion and its relationship to culture and society, see Winnifred Fallers Sulli-
van, Paying the Words Extra: Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United 
States (Harvard U. Press, 1994). 
4. Thiemann is also the author of Constructing a Public Theology: The Church in a 
Pluralistic Culture (Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991) and Revelation and Theology: 
The Gospel as Narrated Promise (U. of Notre Dame Press, 1985), as well as the editor of 
The Legacy of H. Richard Niebuhr (Fortress Press, 1991). 
